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1Introduction
The current global recession is highlighting the fragility of the global banking and 
finance system that is subject to greater risk and acts of fraud. There are new challenges in 
tackling fraud stemming from a fast changing information technology environment, where 
the internet has become one of the most important channels for the retail sector. Kageyama 
(2009) reports that in the past three years more than 900 companies surveyed at a worldwide 
level have lost an average of 8.2 billion dollars a year, a 22% increase with respect to the 
previously published research. Moreover, the percentage of firms that registered  at least one 
fraud in 2008 has reached 85% that is an 80% increase on the previous year. While these 
figures hide the motivation for fraud, the rates of growth are significant and in a time of 
recession this rate is more likely to increase as higher numbers of individuals commit fraud 
(Abbey, 2009).
In 2005 the worlds two largest credit card circuits, Visa and MasterCard, reported 1.14 
billion dollars of fraud losses that represented a 62.9% increase with respect to 1995. In the 
United Kingdom for example credit card fraud is one of the fastest growing crimes and in 
2008 total card fraud losses amounted to more than 609 million pounds, of which 52.5 
million was attributed specifically to online banking fraud (Association for Payment Clearing 
Services, 2009). Arguably, these high amounts can be partially be explained by the high 
volume of transactions and remarkable growth in credit cards ownership over the past three 
decades. Visa (2003) calculates a 10% year on year compound growth since cards were first 
issued. The USA for instance denotes the highest number of issued cards (more than 1.5 
billion) and each inhabitant owns on average more than 5 payment instruments. In Europe 
however, the average card holder owns 1.3 cards and the UK confirms its predominance with 
22.3% of all EU cards and 2.4 cards per capita (Assofin-Crif-Eurisko, 2008).  Such important 
2fraud losses are driving increasing efforts in both the detection and prevention of fraud and 
the implementation of robust risk management practices in the credit card industry.
In this paper credit card fraud is defined as “the misuse of a card – without authorisation 
or unapproved purchases – or the counterfeiting of cards” (Wells, 2007). The motivation and 
opportunity behind credit card fraud are many and varied. Traditional types of fraudulent 
behaviour such as identity theft relate to family members or people that can easily access 
individual’s mail and personal information and committing fraud either by applying for a 
card or taking over the existing account.  Dumpster diving or trashing, where criminals raid 
rubbish bins to search for credit card details and other sensitive information is becoming 
more widespread.  Lost or stolen credit cards may also be used fraudulently.  Skimming of 
the magnetic stripe is also still practiced either using highly sophisticated devices embedded 
in ATM’s or POS or using simple hand held skimmers capable of storing magnetic stripe 
data. 
Internet enabled fraud is also growing; phishing attacks continue to harvest credit card 
users’ details and compromised computer with key loggers provide organised criminals with 
the card details.  As the vast majority of all credit card transactions are now authorised and 
cleared on-line, hacking into the e-payment chain to intercept data can harvest many millions 
of card details.  The e-fraud market has grown.  Criminals are now provided with various 
internet resources to counterfeit credit cards, examples are tipping, custom embossing, 
decoding machines as well as software such as Creditmaster. A common practise is also that 
of phishing where fraudulent emails hijacking brand name of banks, credit cards companies, 
(etc.) are sent aimed at acquiring trickily financial data, account usernames and passwords. 
Organised crime are normally composed by professional criminals that are setting “carding 
forums” where it is possible to buy wide-scale global stolen personal and financial 
information.  This practise that leads to the unauthorised use of sensitive information to 
3purchase goods and services often involves thousands and even millions of victims (Peretti, 
2008). Indeed credit card fraud is subject to technological enhancement and it is in a 
continuous evolution.
However, due the lack of statistical information on fraud - MasterCard for example is the 
only international circuit that provides statistical information on credit card fraud - few 
microeconomics studies are available in this field.  The purpose of this paper is to analyse the 
demographic, socio-economics and banking-specific determinants that influence the risk of a 
credit card fraud. The empirical investigation is based on a unique dataset containing 
approximately 320,000 observations from a recent credit card portfolio issued in Italy.  In 
2004, MasterCard reported that the percentage of fraud in all European countries was 
approximately 0.07% of card holder expenditure while in Italy this figure was 0.05% (Affari 
& Finanza, 2009). The Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS, 2009) reports 
that at a worldwide level Italy is one of the top five countries to have seen an increase in the 
use of fraudulent UK credit cards.   Fraud on UK-issued cards being used in Italy has 
increased by 72.9% since 2005, to £8.3 million in 2008.
For the portfolio of cards under study, the empirical analysis is performed on the risk of 
fraud across three product categories that are classic, gold and revolving. The econometric 
approach is based on a  logit framework, where the probability that a given credit card 
experiences a fraud is estimated.  The dichotomous dependent variable is regressed on a set 
of explanatory variables (e.g. gender, location, outstanding balance, number of transactions 
in euros and non euros). The empirical results provide useful indicators on the factors that are 
likely to influence fraud events based on the available sample. Hence, this framework offers 
not only a microeconomics perspective to analyse the risk of a fraudulent behaviour but most 
importantly an approach to help risk managers in fraud prevention by providing insight into 
which factors may lead to fraudulent events.
4The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, a literature review on credit cards 
fraud is provided. In the third section the methodology employed is highlighted. In the fourth 
section, main empirical results are provided and concluding remarks are given in the last 
section. 
    
A literature review in credit card fraud
Fraud literature, that first appeared in the 1980s, treated a wide range of economic 
activities such as insurance fraud (Dionne, 1984; Clarke, 1989; Artís, Ayuso and Gillén, 
1999; Caudill, Ayuso and Gullén, 2005; Boyer, 2007), medical fraud (Pontell, Jesilow and 
Geis, 1982;  Feldman, 2001;  Rai, 2001) and accounting fraud ( Beasley, 1996; Gerety and 
Lehn, 1997; Sadka, 2006; Crutchley,  Jensen and Marshall, 2007). Though fraudulent 
behaviour has been analysed in financial markets (particularly for securities, bankruptcy and 
money laundering), very few studies exist on credit card fraud.
One of the first papers that appeared in the law and criminology literature on credit card 
fraud (Caminer, 1985) emphasised the need to allow authorities greater access to issuer 
records and to the USA federal government to devote greater resources to the investigation of 
credit card fraud.  Hence, since the 80’s there has been the belief that credit card fraud was 
increasing at an astounding rate and losses were borne by customers themselves. It is 
interesting to note that in Italy over 20 years after the Caminer’s appeal, all card issuers are 
obliged to report all credit card fraud into a central database (Decreto, 2007).
As Bolton and Hand (2002) point out, it is important to distinguish between fraud 
prevention (that is measures to stop fraud occurring in the first place) and fraud detection 
(that is measures to identify as quickly as possible fraud once it has been perpetrated). Very 
few studies analyse how to prevent fraud occurring in the first place. Masuda (1993) for 
example reports a successful retail strategy in credit card fraud prevention. There is evidence 
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intelligence data amongst regional and national authorities seem to be the key to reduce 
credit card fraud. Williams (2007) presents a case study of credit card fraud in Tobago and 
Trinidad, new entry countries into the credit card market, in which a prevention activity can 
be improved by issuing specific laws, educating and informing the public  of the various 
fraudulent   typologies   and   enhancing   the  critical   role   of   the   banking   associations   in 
formulating ad hoc principles and policies to control this type of crime. Barker, D’Amato 
and Sheridon (2008) describe numerous schemes and techniques and give additional
However, detection and prevention cannot be always regarded as distinct actions. To a 
certain extent it is possible to learn from the past fraud patterns in order to prevent similar 
cases occurring in the future.  To this aim, several statistical techniques are available such as 
linear regression, classification trees, naïve Bayes, neural networks and self-organising maps 
(SOM) that builds on the clustering capabilities of neural networks (Thomas, Oliver and 
Hand, 2005). These techniques are aimed at discriminating if a new credit card transaction 
belongs to the genuine set or to the fraudulent set. More recently, Quah and Sriganesh (2008) 
propose a real-time fraud detection and present a new approach to analyse card owners’ 
behaviour for detection of fraud.
In the literature, a commonly used technique to detect credit fraud is logistic regression. 
Such an econometric tool, together with the above mentioned techniques, is mostly employed 
within the credit scoring process to help institutions and organisations decide whether to 
issue credit to consumers who apply for it (Desai, Crook and Overstreet, 1996; Greene, 1998; 
Thomas, 2000; Crook and Banasik, 2004).
From the present literature review, it emerges that empirical studies are mainly concentrated 
on a priori understanding of whether or not to provide consumers with a given bank product 
6(such as a credit card or loan). However, very few papers employ microeconomics bank data 
to analyse the factors that influence the risk of fraud in a portfolio of credit cards. In a recent 
study,   Hartmann-Wendels,   Mählmann   and   Versen   (2009)   make   use   of   a   sample   of 
approximately 200 thousand observations, on successful applicants from a German internet-
only bank, to analyse what factors do affect fraud. The main finding is that fraud risk is 
highly   influenced   by   determinants   such   as   gender,   civil   status,   age,   occupation   an 
urbanisation. Above all, nationality matters as foreign customers are 22.25 times more likely 
to perpetrate a fraud than nationals.  Hence, the present paper aims at expanding this strand 
of research, providing new evidence on the main factors affecting the risk of fraud within the 
Italian credit card market, through the analysis of an extensive credit card data set at a 
microeconomics level. 
Methodology
Definitions and data 
The empirical model presented in this study makes use of banking microeconomics data 
on the risk of fraud occurring on three types of credit cards Classic, Gold and Revolving. A 
credit card can be defined as a payment instrument that may be employed to purchase goods 
and services and, where offered by the issuer, to borrow money on credit. Credit cards can be 
divided into their respective target segments that are mass market, premium, business and 
revolving. Mass market credit cards, sometimes referred to as “classic cards”, are well-spread 
worldwide and usually have a set of basic characteristics; a relatively limited availability to 
spend, point-of-sale (POS) and automated teller machines (ATM) functionality, low or no 
annual fees and limited add on services as insurance and loyalty programmes. Premium 
credit cards, marketed under brands such as “gold”, “premium” and “diamond” are generally 
held by customers that are more likely to have higher incomes and spending propensity and 
7can be thought of as a more sophisticated classic card.  Premium cards are characterised by 
higher joining and annual fees, higher spending and daily cash withdrawal limits as well as 
extra services such as travel insurance, roadside assistance, hotel and car-rental advantages. 
A minimum set of services is mandatory by the international circuit although the issuer is 
free to customise the product.  The business segment  is a vast generic segment of customers 
that includes sole traders and international corporations but, independently of company size, 
the business card must be used exclusively for business transactions as mandated in the card 
contract. 
Cards issued in the mass market, premium and business segments typically require that 
the balance be paid off in full at the end of the billing cycle. The revolving card is often 
similar to the classic card but allows the card owner to spread the payment over a series of 
billing cycles usually paying interest.  Unlike the other segments, the revolving segment 
contains customers who have a need to borrow or are happy to control the way the debt is 
repaid in exchange for an interest payment.  
In the present study gold, classic and revolving segments are analysed.  The data are 
collected from recent account archives (January 2007-December 2008) for bankcards issued 
throughout Italy.  The cards were issued on both the Visa and MasterCard circuits. Overll, 
317,231 thousand card positions are analysed.
It is important to note that this paper employs data on every individual whose application 
for the card was accepted. Clients with a poor credit history are not accepted. This is 
particularly true for the revolving credit cards that are subject to stricter credit acceptance 
rules applied by the bank. Hence, in this circumstance, it is possible that the use of ex post 
selected data leads to biased estimates of the probability to acquire a given payment 
instrument.  This issue is not uncommon in the literature as seen in other academic studies. 
For example, Hartmann-Wendels, Mählmann and Versen (2009), given the data availability, 
8make use of a sample of successful applicants from a German internet-only bank, to analyse 
which factors affect fraud. Hence, even factors that do not explicitly enter into the acceptance 
scoring process, but are at the same time correlated with the variables in the fraud equation 
may cause biased predictions. Nevertheless, the findings emerging from actual data on 
successful applications can shed light on understanding potential fraudulent behaviour in 
credit markets. Besides, from the bank’s perspective understanding determinants of fraud risk 
for the existing customer portfolio is important to risk managers who have to detect, control 
and prevent credit card fraud.
The dependent variable used in the binomial logit model is risk of fraud where risk of 
fraud is defined as a situation where there is risk of or actual evidence of unauthorised use of 
a credit card or its details.  These include also cards that are reported as stolen that are at risk 
of fraud.
Following the empirical study cited in the previous section, a set of explanatory variables 
are also included in the model, as follows: 
· Gender (gen) - This dichotomous variable takes the value one if female, zero if male.
· Location (loc)- These dummy variables take into account the residence of the card 
holder by macro geographical zone in Italy as defined in Table 1.
· Circuit (cr)– This dummy variable takes one as a value if the card has been issued by 
the first circuit and zero by the second circuit. 
·  Ownership or “holder” (hl)– This dummy variable takes the value one if the credit 
card has been issued for a secondary owner and zero otherwise. 
· Outstanding balance (ob)  – The outstanding balance is the sum of all expenditure 
and charges on the card less the amounts paid.  For revolving cards this translates into what 
the customer still needs to pay off at the end of the billing cycle while for classic and gold 
9cards it is what the customer actually pays at the end of the month. Within the sample, the 
maximum value is 20,062 euros, while the minimum value is zero euros.  
· Number of transactions in euros  (nteu) – The number of transactions in euros. 
Within the sample, the minimum value is zero, while the maximum value is 87 transactions.
· Number of transactions in non-euros (ntneu) – The number of transactions in a 
foreign currency rather than euro. Within the sample, the minimum value is zero, while the 
maximum value is 58 transactions.
· Credit line (cl)– This is a continuous variable that accounts for the amount of the 
spending limit of the card. Within the sample, the minimum value is 1,000 euros, while the 
maximum value is 50,000 euros.
Table 2 provides a statistical description of the dichotomous variables under investigation. 
The Pearson c
2 statistics tests for the null hypothesis that the distribution of fraud case does 
not differ across the categories of the variable. Hence, the result is that all the variables are 
highly dependent with the risk of fraud.
 The model specification
The aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate the probability that a given type of credit 
card experiences a risk of fraud.  This framework is made operational by using a particular 
distribution for the disturbances, that is a logit model within a discrete choice structure 
(Greene, 2003). Formally, a vector of dependent variables is observed  Yi,  = (Y1, Y2). 
Specifically, if a customer is characterised at risk of fraud (either where the customer is the 
fraudster or is a victim of fraud), and hence a given credit card is at a fraud risk, Yi takes the 
value one; likewise, if customer i belongs to the genuine set, and hence a given credit card is 
not subject to risk of fraud, then Y2 takes the value zero. Because coefficients change from 
1one regime to another, probabilities (P) change leading to a new index (I). In analytical 
terms: 
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that is the probability of a fraudulent action is assumed to be a function of customers’ 
behaviour and a set of determinants  (age, location, credit line, etc.) defined as Xi; b0 and b1 
are the parameters to be estimated; e is the logistic functional form that allows one to ensure 
that the estimated choice probabilities lie between zero and one; L is the cumulative logistic 
distribution function. The logistic regression is estimated using maximum likelihood.
In discrete choice models, estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted in terms of 
elasticity. Hence, marginal effects, that represent the impact of a one-unit change in the 
explanatory variable on the dependent variable, ceteris paribus, can be also computed. In 
analytical terms given the index I and the probability P:
















then the marginal effect of changes in X on this probability is given by:








The marginal effect (ME) for dummy variables is computed by employing the means of all 
the other variables. This gives an accurate measure of elasticity as if the dichotomy variable 
were a continuous one (Greene, 2003). Regression results are reported in the second column 
of Table 3.
1In the empirical literature, more often, the Relative Risk Ratio (RRR) is reported (see for 
example Ardiç and Yüzereroğlu, 2006).  This ratio is given by the exponential function of the 
estimated coefficient (b) and it is reported in absolute terms:
RRR = exp (b)           (10)
RRR also expresses the ratio of the probability of choosing one category over the probability 
of choosing the reference category. In other words, for one unit change in one of the 
explanatory variables, it computes how many percent the relative risk of choosing a given 
category is with respect to the reference category change. Values above one indicate that 
higher values of the explanatory variable increase the predicted probability of a given 
category compared to the reference category. Coefficients less than one indicate the opposite.
 Empirical findings
The main findings from the logit regression are reported in Table 3. With only one 
exception, all of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The overall 
statistics indicate a well-specified model: the likelihood ratio test (LR(11)) show that the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are jointly statistically significant; the Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (that is Pearson c
2) fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
distribution fits the data.
Considering the first dichotomous variable gen (gender), the probability ratio indicates 
women are 1.36 times riskier than men. This outcome can be interpreted in a number of 
ways: women may be more likely to discover and report a fraudulent event than men; their 
behaviour and spending patterns puts the card at a greater risk; women may commit more 
fraud than men. As pointed out by Epaynews (2009), women are more likely to commit fraud 
in mail order, communications and loans, whereas men fraudster in areas such as asset 
finance and insurance.
1Location turns to be an important factor in explaining risk fraud in credit cards. 
Customers who are resident in the Centre of Italy are the riskiest category in comparison to 
the reference one but also to the other geographical areas. The customers who are resident in 
the South tend to show a relative lower risk.
The second circuit is affected only 36% by fraud risk and, hence, the first circuit has 2.75 
times more probability to incur in a fraud. This finding is of a particular interest for banking 
institutions that should closely consider banking specific features such as the security 
standards for a given circuit. Besides, this result may also be explained by the risk propensity 
of the pool of customers inherent to each of the circuits.    
As an additional outcome, secondary card owners are significantly more likely to be at 
risk of fraud (Table 3). In general, secondary card owners are close relatives of the primary 
owner (e.g. partners, children); these individuals may be less aware of the various fraudulent 
typologies and are more likely to be at risk. 
Overall, the coefficients of the continuous variables (ob, nteu, ntneu, cl) are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, with the only exception for ntneu. However, the effects on the 
risk of fraud is very small, as highlighted by the marginal effects results. According to the 
RRR for nteu and ntneu, the transaction in euros are slightly more risky than the non-euros 
transactions. 
 Conclusions
In the credit market literature, only a few studies make use of banking data to analyse the 
risk of fraud for a given set of credit cards (i.e. classic, gold and revolving credit cards). In 
this paper, a logit analysis has been conducted to assess which factors may lead to the risk of 
fraud. Fraud has been defined as an unauthorised use of a credit card, including card details, 
and also stolen cards that are potentially at risk of fraud. To this aim, microeconomic data 
1have been employed for more than 300 thousand observations. Data were obtained from 
recent account archives for bankcards issued throughout Italy.  The model has focused on 
socio-demographic as well as banking-specific factors influencing the probability to incur a 
risk of fraud. Marginal effects and relative risk ratio have been computed.   Overall, the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables included in the model are statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  
The results have shown that the risk of fraud in credit cards is influenced by many 
determinants: gender, location, type of circuit, card ownership, credit line and number of 
transactions  divided  by currency.  Women   have been   found  to  be riskier  than   men. 
Geographic location also matters. The Centre of Italy denotes customers that are likely to 
lead to a higher risk of fraud for the bank. Overall, the least risky geographical zone is the 
Islands.
 As a banking specific feature, transactions within the second circuit have denoted higher 
standards of security with respect to the first circuit. Furthermore, risk managers should also 
increase fraud prevention in transactions made by secondary owners who have been found to 
be 1.28 times more risky than principal owner.
Though the coefficients of the continuous variables (ob, nteu, cl) are statistically 
significant, the marginal effects on fraud risk are quite small. Overall, the transaction in euros 
are slightly riskier than the non-euro transactions. The empirical findings show that an 
increase in either the credit line or in the amount the client needs to pay at the end of the 
billing cycle should not imply a higher risk. 
This paper is a novel example of consumer finance research on fraud risk. A discrete 
choice model has helped to systematically analyse the potential fraudulent behaviour  within 
the credit card market, where customers can be considered either as fraudsters or as victims. 
The empirical findings offer insightful information to risk managers on the characteristics 
1and behaviour of their pool of clients and on the potential factors that may lead to fraudulent 
actions.  Bankers can employ actual positions to assess fraud risk and to discriminate 
customers into the genuine set or the at risk set. Risk managers should also closely consider 
banking specific features such as standards of security for a given circuit. 
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1Table 1 Geographical zones
1 0 0 0 0 is
0 1 0 0 0 sou
0 0 1 0 0 cent
0 0 0 1 0 ne
0 0 0 0 1 nw
is sou cent ne nw dummy
variables
1 0 0 0 0 is
0 1 0 0 0 sou
0 0 1 0 0 cent
0 0 0 1 0 ne
0 0 0 0 1 nw
is sou cent ne nw dummy
variables
NOTE. -- Standard definitions of geographical zones are employed (ISTAT, 2009); North West (nw),
 North East (ne), Centre (cent), South (sou) that is also use as the reference category, 
Islands (is, Sardinia and Sicily). The locations of the  cardholder is given by a mapping of their postal address zip code 
 to geographical zone using tables produced by the Institute Post Office.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of dichotomous variables
Fraud 
Risk = 0 %
No Fraud 
Risk =1 % Total
Gender
Male 190,335 98.37 3,157 1.63 193,492
Female 120,962 97.76 2,777 2.24 123,739
Total  311,297 98.13 5,934 1.87 317,231
Pearson c2= 154.328 (0.000)
Location
NW 8,522 97.61 209 2.39 8,731
NE 136,276 97.64 3,294 2.36 139,570
CEN 13,348 97.13 394 2.87 13,742
SOU 64,748 98.11 1,245 1.89 65,993
IS 88,403 99.11 792 0.89 89,195
Total  311,297 98.13 5934 1.87 317,231
Pearson c2= 738.868 (0.000)
Cardholder
Principal 301,995 98.15 5,686 1.85 307,681
Secondary 9,302 97.40 248 2.60 9,550
Total  311,297 98.13 5,934 1.87 317,231
Pearson c2= 28.300 (0.000)
Circuit
I circuit 204,886 97.55 5,154 2.45 210,040
II circuit 106,411 99.27 780 0.73 107,191
Total  311297 98.13 5934 1.87 317,231
Pearson c2= 1.20E+03 (0.000)
Notes: p.value in parenthesis
1Table 3 Logit regression results 
  Coefficients ME
Probability 
ratio
Gender (ref. male)      
gen  0.320 *** 0.00500 *** 1.36  ***
Location (ref. Islands)      
nw 0.556 *** 0.013 *** 1.87  ***
ne 0.844 *** 0.010 *** 1.74  ***
cent 0.333 *** 0.019 *** 2.28  ***
sou 0.251 *** 0.006 *** 1.39  ***
Circuit (ref. I circuit)      
cr  -1.029 *** 0.014 *** 0.36  ***
Ownership (ref. 
principal)      
hl  0.251 *** 0.004 *** 1.28  ***
Outstanding balance      
ob ^ 0.0002 ***  3.52E-06 *** 1.000 *** 
Type transactions      
nteu ^ 0.0245 *** 0.0004 *** 1.025 *** 
ntneu ^ 0.0156   0.000 1.016  
Credit line      
cl ^ 0.0000413 *** 6.28E-07 *** 1.000 *** 




LR c2(11) 1986.33 ***  
Pearson c2(11)  44561.75 (p-value 0.998)  
Log likelihood -28495.967          
Notes: *** indicates statistically significance at the 1%  level; 
2